Raised on the Third Day: Defending the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus

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“When we consider the historian’s epistemic access to the past, we find that there do not appear to be any reasons a priori that a historian could not, in principle, investigate the actions of divine agents. Moreover, given the nature of the discipline as an open inquiry into the past, examining the alleged actions of divine agents is similar to historical investigation into human or non-human agents. This also means that claims of miracles, like other claims about past events, should be critically assessed.¹⁰⁴ Historians should not shy away from these investigations. In fact, given their training, investigating such claims can be incredibly helpful in the discussion.” (Page 287)

“Now, when it comes to morality, it is hard to make sense of moral obligation and responsibility if determinism is true. They seem to presuppose libertarian freedom.” (Page 24)

“Because of their sincere belief that Jesus had risen and appeared to them after his death, the apostles willingly suffered and were prepared to die for their public proclamation of the risen Christ. They did not invent the stories but willingly suffered because of the depth of their sincerity. As Gary Habermas has noted, virtually all scholars who research in this area accept that the apostles had experiences they believed were actual appearances of the risen Jesus, which transformed their lives, and for which they were willing to die.” (Page 180)

“the New Testament writers did not create the resurrection—the resurrection created the New Testament writers.” (Page 337)

“These two facts—I am the owner of my experiences, and I am an enduring self—show that I am not identical to my experiences. I am the conscious thing that has them. I am also aware of myself as a simple, uncomposed and spatially nonextended center of consciousness (e.g. the range of objects in my visual field is spatially extended, but my visual field itself is not, nor is the entity—I—that possesses it). In short, I am a mental substance. Moreover, I am fully present throughout my body; if my arm is cut off, I do not become four fifths of a self. My body and brain are divisible and can be present in percentages (there could be 80 percent of a brain present after an operation). But I am an all-or-nothing kind of thing. I am not divisible; I cannot be present in percentages.” (Pages 19–20)